Add to ORKGWe examine the effects that passive investments in rival firms have on the incentives of firms to engage in tacit collusion. In general, these incentives depend in a complex way on the entire partial cross ownership (PCO) structure in the industry. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions for PCO arrangements to facilitate tacit collusion and also examine how tacit collusion is affected when firms ’ controllers make direct passive investments in rival firms. 1
tThe paper is motivated by the empirical observations of passive non-controlling partial ownership a...
In an infinitely repeated game where firms with (possibly asymmetric) capacity constraints can make ...
The question of whether and how partial common-ownership links between strategically interacting fir...
This paper shows how competing firms can facilitate tacit collusion by making passive investments in...
The coordinated competitive effects of silent ownerships in rival firms is investigated, to provide ...
We analyse takeovers in an industry with bilateral capital-linked firms in cross partial ownership (...
We use the model developed by Clayton and Jorgensen (2005) to analyze the effect of cross holding on...
YesWe analyse takeovers in an industry with bilateral capital‐linked firms in cross partial ownershi...
We analyse takeovers in an industry with bilateral capital-linked firms in Cross Partial Ownerships ...
We analyse takeovers in an industry with bilateral capital‐linked firms in cross partial ownership (...
We analyse takeovers in an industry with bilateral capital-linked firms in Cross Partial Ownership (...
In this paper we compare the profitability of a merger to the profitability of a partial ownership a...
This paper analyzes the effect of cooperation in manufacturing on firms ’ inclination to collude in ...
Abstract This paper departs from the standard profit-maximizing model of firm behavior by assuming t...
Minority shareholdings have been on the regulatory agenda of competition authorities for some time. ...
tThe paper is motivated by the empirical observations of passive non-controlling partial ownership a...
In an infinitely repeated game where firms with (possibly asymmetric) capacity constraints can make ...
The question of whether and how partial common-ownership links between strategically interacting fir...
This paper shows how competing firms can facilitate tacit collusion by making passive investments in...
The coordinated competitive effects of silent ownerships in rival firms is investigated, to provide ...
We analyse takeovers in an industry with bilateral capital-linked firms in cross partial ownership (...
We use the model developed by Clayton and Jorgensen (2005) to analyze the effect of cross holding on...
YesWe analyse takeovers in an industry with bilateral capital‐linked firms in cross partial ownershi...
We analyse takeovers in an industry with bilateral capital-linked firms in Cross Partial Ownerships ...
We analyse takeovers in an industry with bilateral capital‐linked firms in cross partial ownership (...
We analyse takeovers in an industry with bilateral capital-linked firms in Cross Partial Ownership (...
In this paper we compare the profitability of a merger to the profitability of a partial ownership a...
This paper analyzes the effect of cooperation in manufacturing on firms ’ inclination to collude in ...
Abstract This paper departs from the standard profit-maximizing model of firm behavior by assuming t...
Minority shareholdings have been on the regulatory agenda of competition authorities for some time. ...
tThe paper is motivated by the empirical observations of passive non-controlling partial ownership a...
In an infinitely repeated game where firms with (possibly asymmetric) capacity constraints can make ...
The question of whether and how partial common-ownership links between strategically interacting fir...